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(Thematic work group)

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Religion and Nation in Ukraine during the 19th and 20th Centuries: a Short Survey

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Uno dei cambiamenti più significativi sulla carta politica europea è la presenza dell'Ucraina, diventata indipendente nel 1991, come nuovo stato che viene a collocarsi fra l'ex-Unione Sovietica e l'Unione Europea allargata.

Come tutte le "neo" repubbliche post-sovietiche, l'Ucraina attraversa ancora un periodo di transizione, punteggiato di difficoltà economiche, sociali e politiche. Essa ha comunque avviato un processo di affermazione nazionale e di riscoperta/rielaborazione del proprio passato, che si è variamente intrecciato al più ampio processo di revisione storico-politica vissuto dal mondo comunista nel suo complesso.

In questo capitolo ho indagato il rapporto fra religione e nazione/nazionalità sotto il profilo di una ricomposizione dell'identità ucraina, che è parte essenziale del processo di costruzione nazionale che il paese sta ancora compiendo. Dopo una rapida panoramica della situazione attuale che vede la presenza sul suolo ucraino di cinque diverse Chiese e di altre storiche comunità religiose (Armeni, Ebrei, Musulmani, Protestanti) che hanno specifiche istituzioni di riferimento, mi sono soffermata sui principali studi apparsi negli ultimi quindici anni.

La mia attenzione si è concentrata in particolare sul periodo a cavallo fra Ottocento e Novecento, quando si concretizzano le aspirazioni all'unità ed all'indipendenza che troveranno una parziale realizzazione nel periodo 1917-1921 e sul periodo successivo, che ha comportato nell'Ucraina sovietica diverse forme di persecuzione religiosa e nazionale, il cui peso è ancora d'ostacolo nella vita dell'Ucraina attuale.

Ho richiamato quindi la necessità di implementare gli studi sul XIX e XX secolo, esaminando in modo comparativo e sul lungo periodo i rapporti fra religione e nazione/nazionalità nelle differenti regioni ucraine; di riservare la dovuta attenzione al periodo rivoluzionario (1917-1921); di seguire il destino della Chiesa sotto il regime sovietico; di analizzare le relazioni esistenti fra le varie religioni presenti in Ucraina nei loro rapporti reciproci e verso lo stato; di tenere in considerazione il ruolo e l'influenza delle Chiese e delle comunità emigrate sulla realtà ucraina; di analizzare il ruolo della "Chiesa del silenzio" nel contesto del fenomeno del dissenso in Ucraina e in Unione Sovietica; di esaminare i materiali archivistici in Ucraina ed all'estero, non trascurando le fonti vaticane che sono consultabili almeno fino al 1922.

In conclusione si può dire che in questi anni si è assistito ad una innovazione in campo storiografico a livello di fonti, metodi e problematiche che senz'altro apre una nuova e feconda fase nello sviluppo degli studi storici ucraini, nello specifico ed in generale.

The changes that have occurred in Eastern Europe in the last fifteen years have reshaped the political map of the whole continent. One of the most interesting new realities is an independent Ukraine, whose presence halfway between East and West has given a new outline to European borders. But western knowledge about this country is still deficient in many ways.

The reasons of this lack of knowledge are deeply rooted in the past. Ukraine has been considered for centuries as a part of the multinational states or empires to which it has belonged (Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Austrian and Russian Empire, Soviet Union) and, to a great extent, has been deprived of the opportunity to have its own history and culture recognized. Nevertheless, Ukraine has a history and a specific culture, worthy of study. Being positioned at the crossroads of various, often contrasting influences, Ukraine is in many ways a frontier region between East and West, not only from a geopolitical standpoint, but also from a cultural and religious one¹.

Historically, Ukraine has been placed at the core of a trade network, but has also been turned into a battlefield. This situation continues to have consequences even now: the Orange revolution has demonstrated once again the difficulties Ukraine meets in finding its position between Russia – which is ready to satellitise it – and Europe – which is having trouble considering the extension of its eastern borders beyond the limits of the former Soviet Union. Apart from the political and strategic problems menacing the newly acquired independence, I would like to stress the need that Ukraine has to recreate its self-perception, to reinterpret the collective memory and to consolidate civil democratic life.

In this difficult on-going transition process, culture undoubtedly has a great role to play. With this in mind, I would like to focus attention on the crucial problem of the interplay between religion and nation, because this is traditionally a central issue in the building of Ukrainian self-perception, an old-new problem that deserves great attention.

Generally speaking, the topics of Nation and Religion have acquired prominence in scholarly consideration of Eastern Europe since the fall of communism and the reopening of unsolved questions². Ukraine can be a very interesting case study because of the co-presence on its soil of many religions and competing Churches³. The problem of identity has not been solved and, in many ways, this identity problem is connected with religious denomination. Ukraine is a country that is still undergoing a process of nation building. It is obvious to all observers, both inside and outside the country, that religion and nation and/or nationality raise difficult issues and problems. The goal would be that of building a secular state which supports all religions and national minorities with tolerance: we cannot forget that in Ukraine there are consistent communities of Protestants, Jews and Muslim aspiring to have their rights preserved and confirmed in everyday life.

The actual situation is very complex. Undoubtedly, with the end of communism and the inception of independence, Ukrainian religious life was able to emerge onto the

surface. In the beginning, there were three Churches of Eastern Byzantine tradition, and one Church of Western Latin tradition: the Ukrainian Catholic Church, also called the Uniate⁴ or Greek-Catholic Church (UGCC), the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC), the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and the Roman Catholic Church. The first two Churches (UGCC and UAOC) had undergone severe persecution during the twenties and thirties, and their properties had been confiscated and transferred to the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). Notwithstanding the officially professed atheism, Moscow privileged, in accordance with the long tsarist tradition, the Russian Orthodox Church as a tool of Russification against possible concurrent nationalisms. The first conflict involving the three Eastern Churches broke out during the first few years after independence (1991) and concerned the issue of the confiscated properties. The Russian Orthodox Church, in accordance with the Soviet government, had administrated these properties⁵. Later, another serious conflict broke out inside the Orthodox world itself, that eventually gave birth to three branches of the Orthodox Church as a whole: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP), the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyivan Patriarchate (UOC-KP), and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC). Other historical religious communities (Armenians, Jews, Muslims, Protestants) have their religious institutions on Ukrainian territory, where there are around seventy different officially registered religions.

It is worth noting that both the conflict between Uniate and Orthodox, and the conflict within Orthodoxy itself, are focused on the question of the country's identity and history. These conflicts are less theological than cultural or political. This judgement was widespread among the commentators of the Orange Revolution: at that time, it was very common to read or hear that the country was divided into two halves, following a cultural and confessional inner borderline. From this perspective, commentators and analysts located a block faithful to the Russian Orthodoxy in the east and the south, and a block faithful to the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and the Latin (Roman)-Catholic Church in the west. Politically, this division was meant to be an indicator of a pro-Russian attitude versus a pro-western one. In reality, the situation doesn't correspond to this easy schema. The believers of the Greek-Catholic Church, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church, and the Roman Catholic Church (belonging generally to Polish or Hungarian linguistic minorities) consider themselves to be Ukrainians as much as the believers of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyivan Patriarchate do. Eventually, the Ukrainian identity can cohabit with a Russian or post-Soviet identity. This complex situation is due to the historical division of the Ukrainian lands among the neighbouring States which has existed since the medieval period. The Ukrainian question dates back to Kyivan Rus', the common point of origin of the present Eastern Slavs, the Russians, the Ukrainians and the Belarusians.

Christianised in 988 in accordance with the Greek rite, the Kyivan Rus' disintegrated in the 13th century because of domestic conflicts and the Mongol invasion. The

Ukrainian lands that had been part of Kyivan Rus', following a period of independence centred around the Kingdom of Galicia-Volhynia, were incorporated along with the Belarusian ones, mostly into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. When Lithuania united itself with the Kingdom of Poland in 1569, creating the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (*Rzeczpospolita*), the major part of Ukrainian lands came under Polish rule. In 1596, the religious Union of Brest was signed, founding the Uniate Church which was also called Greek-Catholic because it conserved the traditional Byzantine liturgy and rites, while recognizing the Pope as its head. This Union, nevertheless, did not prompt the disappearance of the Orthodox Church, but gave rise to the co-presence of two rival Byzantine Churches, namely the Greek-Catholic and the Orthodox, in a territory where the Latin-Catholic Church retained a dominant position. In the 17th century, the Cossacks became the champions of the Orthodox cause, especially under the leadership of the Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky: in 1654, owing to the Union of Pereiaslav between the Cossack Host and Russia, the territories of the Dnepr's Left Bank – called Hetmanate – came under Russian sovereignty; from 1772 to 1795, and, as a result of the partitioning of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Dnepr's Right Bank came under Russian rule as well. In the meantime, the regions further to the west, i.e. Galicia and Transcarpathia, were incorporated by the Absburg empire that already possessed Bukovina, the northern part of Moldavia, inhabited by Romanians and, partially, by Ukrainians. After World War I, the western Ukrainian territories – Galicia, Transcarpathia, Bukovina – were divided among Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania, while the Russians' central and eastern territories already formed the new Ukrainian Soviet Republic. After World War II, owing to Stalin's conquests, Ukraine regained the major part of the western territories, thereby acquiring its present geo-political demarcation. A very important moment in this story is the 1917-1921 period, when an independent Ukrainian Republic was founded. For a short while, it realized the 19th century's nationalistic dream of creating a state for all Ukrainians from west to east⁶. Only now has that dream become a reality.

The points on the historical research agenda regarding Ukraine are many and controversial. Even though historians are independent from the political necessities of the day, it is clear that the end of communism and the renewed independence finally allowed the restarting of a series of studies interrupted during the Soviet era. In Ukraine, as in Russia, since *glasnost*, the desire to fill in the blank spaces of national history has provoked a request for "more history" from civil society. Historians, either from the West or from the East, have tried to fulfil this demand⁷, even though cultural operators independent from the academic world, such as journalists and publicists, have very often preceded them, especially during the first years of independence. Whatever the case may be, we have seen the renewal of historical studies that have also involved western historiography, which during the soviet period very often did not touch upon sensitive problems or enlarge its research perspective sufficiently, notwithstanding the freedom it enjoyed.

The historiographical interest for the genesis and the developments of the Union of Brest is vital. As Sophia Senyk wrote, "literature about the Union of Brest began to ap-

pear almost immediately after the Synod of October 1596 that confirmed it. Defenders and opponents took pen in order to promote or hinder this success. This polemical bent of literature about the Union has persisted to the present day. Polemics is seldom original; polemics about the Union has repeated certain statements so often that they tend to be accepted on faith even by scholars, not needing verification⁸. In the last decade, scientific works studying the problem from different points of view in accordance with the different national historiographical traditions have appeared⁹. The result is encouraging because it demonstrates the attempt to offer the present discussion a solid base.

The status and existence of the Greek-Catholic Church is still contested by intransigent Russophile Orthodox, in Ukraine and, of course, in Russia: following a long tradition of self-preservation from external influences, they see the Greek-Catholic Church as a tool in the hands of the Vatican, or their Catholic neighbour, Poland. We have to take into account that the moral and organizational crisis experienced by the Orthodox Church, due to its long coexistence with an atheistic and totalitarian power like the Soviet regime, fuelled the fear that the concurrent Churches could gain a moral primacy and material help from abroad, as in the case of the Uniate Church, formally linked to the Vatican. This suspicion, coupled with hostility towards everything coming directly or indirectly from abroad, was extended to the Protestant groups which flourished in the new liberal situation. They were seen as modern Westernised elements, very capable of pursuing social programs, a field in which all the Ukrainian Churches lacked experience, because social work had been prohibited under the Soviet regime. The problem of the pastoral separation between the hierarchy and the flock was a great problem for all the Churches in Ukraine. They could gain favour with the people by reinforcing their symbolic image, resting on history and tradition, but the Greek-Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church were in a better moral position because of their suffering during the Soviet period and their clandestine activity.

During the Soviet period, the Uniates suffered from severe repression, and their Church survived underground or abroad¹⁰. When it reappeared on the surface, enthusiasm for its renewal was undoubtedly great. Cardinal Lubomyr Husar decided to transfer the Metropolitan see from Lviv, in Galicia, to Kyiv, where Greek Catholics are relatively few: this symbolic act, approved by the Vatican, governed by a Polish Pope, was seen as a Catholic provocation, and embittered the relationship between the two confessions. In a series of interviews given by Cardinal Husar, edited together with other texts by Antoine Arjakovsky, the Ukrainian primate explained the important reason that lay behind this move. First of all, the fact that even the Greek-Catholic Church belongs to the Kyivan tradition, no less than the other Orthodox Churches: in the light of this truth, the Greek-Catholic Church has a right to be present in Kyiv, the capital of the State, the centre of the original Metropolitanate of Kyiv and all Rus', and the centre of Ukrainian religion and spirituality from the earliest times. Cardinal Husar stressed the necessity to reconsider the relationship between religion and nation in a larger Christian perspective. In his words:

Nous sommes des Ukrainiens, nous sommes des chrétiens, nous sommes de tradition orientale, et nous sommes aussi en communion avec le siège apostolique de Rome. Cela signifie qu'être dans cette communion ne fait pas de nous des êtres moins ukrainiens, moins chrétiens, moins orthodoxes dans le sens d'appartenance à la tradition Byzantine. Ceci a toujours été impensable pour les patriarches de Moscou et pour beaucoup d'autres églises orthodoxes. Et je pense que cela devient excessif. Cela doit être dépassé.

We are Ukrainians, we are Christians, we are of the Eastern tradition, and we are also in communion with the Apostolic See in Rome. To belong to this communion does not make of us a group of beings who are less Ukrainian, less Christian, less Orthodox in the sense of belonging to the Byzantine tradition. This has always been inconceivable for the patriarchs of Moscow and for many other orthodox churches. And I think that this has become exaggerated, and has to be overcome ¹¹.

Cardinal Husar explained his ecumenical purpose, which appeared quite unrealistic in the troubled Ukrainian context. At the same time, he aspired to have an official Patriarchy for the Greek-Catholic Church instituted by the Pope, in accordance with an old request that could not be satisfied in the last century because of the difficult relationships between the Roman Church and the Orthodox World¹². The Orthodox establishment fears the proselytism of the Greek-Catholic Church and stigmatises its presence in eastern and southern Ukraine as an aggressive move, although the Greek-Catholic Church also has a lot of believers in those parts of Ukraine and other parts of the former Soviet Union owing to the persecution and forceful re-location of the Western Ukrainian Greek-Catholic flock in different regions under the Soviet regime. These believers, or their descendants, are calling for a parish Greek-Catholic presence. Once again the burden of history plays its role in the present polemics.

Historically, the Greek-Catholic Church is rooted in the former Austrian part of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, because its relative presence in the Russian part was erased definitively during the 19th century between 1839 and 1875 (Chełm diocese)¹³ by the Tsarist government. As illustrated above, Ukrainian lands were always divided into different States: because they were mainly part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, they came under Russian or Austrian rule after its partition. In the Austrian part, the existence of the Greek-Catholic Church was permitted even though the Latin-Catholic Church was, owing to the Polish dominant influence, always strong. During the 19th century, the Greek-Catholic Church became the guardian of Ukrainian self-perception. In the Russian part of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth there was no room for the Greek-Catholic Church: it was seen as a schismatic phenomenon to be suppressed and reincorporated into the main confession¹⁴. After World War II, when the lands that had fallen under Polish rule after World War I, i.e. Galicia, and under Czechoslovakian rule, i.e. Subcarpathian Rus', were reclaimed by the Soviet Union, the Greek-Catholic Church was suppressed (in Galicia in 1946 and in Subcarpathian Rus' in 1949¹⁵) and absorbed by the Russian-Soviet Orthodox Church.

Generally, in the Russian Empire, the Orthodox Church was conceived as an instrument of Russian centralism. As a result of the Pereiaslav agreement of 1654¹⁶, any at-

tempt to preserve a specific Ukrainian identity, even though Orthodox, in the Ukrainian lands under the Tsarist rule, was severely inhibited¹⁷, as the absorption of the Kyivan Metropolitanate by the Moscow Patriarchate since the late seventeenth century well demonstrates¹⁸. This move responded to the idea of the primacy of Russia as the unique heir of Kyivan Rus¹⁹.

During the Soviet period, the Bolshevik power played *divide et impera* with the various confessions in the context of the struggle against religions, in accordance with its atheistic ideology. At first, when it wanted to defeat the Russian Orthodox Church, it helped to establish the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church; during the 1920s and 1930s, it began to persecute this Church as well; during the war, when the Church-State partnership was in place, only the Russian Orthodox Church was tolerated and, in a certain way, promoted, because once again it helped to support the imperial attitude of the political centre. The crisis of the Soviet Union and its further developments questioned that supremacy.

It is now possible to have an open discussion on these crucial points, and the collection of articles written by Serhii Plokyh and Frank E. Sysyn, scholars of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies (CIUS), and published under the title *Religion and Nation in Modern Ukraine*²⁰, is very interesting regarding this matter.

Serhii Plokyh is the author of another distinguished study on the interplay between secular and religious ideas in Ukrainian history. In this case, attention is focused on the crucial period 1561-1654 when the Cossacks arose as defenders of Orthodoxy in a movement culminating with the famous Khmelnytsky uprising. As Plokyh wrote: "The use of religious slogans, most notably appeals to fight for the rights of persecuted Orthodoxy, gave Cossackdom a unique opportunity to legitimise its rebellions not only as a defence of the rights and privileges of its own estate but also as a vindication of the rights of the whole Ruthenian nation"²¹. The consequences were enormous:

having declared the Orthodox Church dominant on the territory of the Cossack polity and prohibited, or greatly complicated, the presence within its boundaries of organized communities of Catholics, Uniates, Protestants, and Jews, Cossackdom effectively renounced the principle of religious toleration professed by Orthodox of the previous age and took on the project of building a monoconfessional state. (...) The Council of Pereiaslav and Khmelnytsky's acceptance of the Muscovite protectorate also could not fail to strengthen the Cossack officers' resolution to establish a purely Orthodox Cossack state²².

But, as Plokyh stressed, because the Orthodox religion bonded Cossack Ukraine with Tsarist Muscovy and later with the Russian Empire, the religion, over the long period, did not help the growth of a Ukrainian sense of distinctiveness as was the case in the western part of Ukraine that was socially and culturally dominated by Poles. This difference between the eastern part and the western part of Ukraine was felt during the 19th century, when a specific Ukrainian nationalism arose. For this reason, the Greek-Catholic Church in Galicia – and to a lesser extent in the Carpathian Rus' – were able to play a major role in the development of a national Ukrainian identity. As John Paul Himka demonstrated in his works dedicated to the western Ukraine, religion and na-

tionality were tied here in several ways²³. This kind of study is very precious in order to evaluate the situation in all Ukrainian lands over the last two centuries, even though it is always necessary to look up to the Early Modern Age in order to understand the complexity of inherited questions. The historiographical panorama of the last ten years presents a wealth of interesting perspectives to be further developed in many directions. Of course, the contemporaneity attracts attention, because the religious situation in Ukraine is still very fluid, and the possibility of openly following one's chosen religion is still not taken for granted by many. From a historical point of view, we have to remark upon the need to pursue historical research apart from the compelling necessities of the present. One of the most promising trends is that of comparative studies. In the case of Ukraine, a comparative approach is absolutely necessary because the partition among different countries during its past has determined different developments in various cultural and political contexts. In general, a comparative analysis is required for historians dealing with the vicissitudes of Eastern Central Europe, where the boundaries – ethnic, national, religious etc. – changed so often and abruptly, frequently leaving the population in a situation of uncertainty with regard to their real identities. Some questions arise: how is the discourse of proto-national identity connected with the discourse of confessional identity in Europe's Christian culture? How did confessional and ethnic traditions shape cultural identities in Europe? How did these discourses influence the construction of the national identity during the 19th and 20th centuries under the dominating secular trend of development of the European societies? Are the differences between East and West really so deep as would appear at a first glance? And with regard to the East, what are the differences within the different countries? This is a rich field of study which has already attracted some groups of researchers, and the results would be undoubtedly of great interest. I would like to stress that Ukrainian studies are developing in several centres in Europe, in Canada, in the United States and in Israel. In this context, many researchers are also studying religious problems in all their complexity as well as organizing seminars, congresses, courses and publications. Of course, the domain of Ukrainian studies encounters some difficulties gaining recognition in the academic world as a distinct field within the traditional structure of Slavic studies – both historical and literary – but things are changing quite rapidly.

Here, I would like to adapt some general historiographical considerations to a more limited object of study. As I wrote above, the year 1991 can be seen as a watershed in the historiography concerning Eastern Europe and Russia. Dealing with the Ukrainian case study obliges us to consider the broader context of post-Soviet historiography regarding Church and Religion²⁴. In Soviet times, the topic of religion was neglected or subordinated to the standpoint of Marxism-Leninism, which excluded *a priori* a long series of important questions. Now the field of research is undoubtedly as large as it has been in the West and new methods, approaches and perspectives are entering the post-Soviet historiography, including Western historiography post-1991. Even though the field of study is not so rich as one might suppose, the volume of publications has increased greatly compared to the previous period, thanks to the opening-up of archives.

In particular, it is interesting to notice that several studies are currently examining the Russian Orthodox Church, in order to review stereotypes of the previous period. The image of this Church as the “handmaiden of the state”²⁵ has been seriously challenged, stressing the moment of conflict with the Russian government during the last period of the old regime; the impact of modernization processes and urbanization on religion has been considered together with the attitudes of different strata of Russian society *vis-à-vis* religion, paying special attention to rural and popular religion; the trends of secularisation during the 19th and 20th centuries have been examined, comparing the Western world with that of Russia; a gender approach to religious history has been instigated; the study of religious minorities in Russia, i.e. Jews, Muslims, Catholics, Protestants, Old Believers, Sectarrians etc. has been reconsidered; the relationship between ethnic identity, nationality and religion has been investigated. As I. Mukhina concludes, regarding the rich survey of historiography on Church and Religion in Imperial Russia, “the study of religion is still poorly developed and not comparable with the historiography of religion in Western European countries”, even though it is worth noting the improvement accomplished in the last fifteen years²⁶. If, at the beginning of the historiographical renewal, historians in every part of the former Soviet system felt compelled to investigate the “blank spaces” or “dark holes” of their country’s history, now they can concentrate on other topics, not immediately related to the needs of the society. They can explore new topics, or reconsider traditional topics of national and religious history in a different light, thanks to access to well-developed methods and themes in Western historiography, from social history to gender studies, from history of mentality to the “post-modern” approaches. If we consider Ukraine, I think that we must not neglect the necessity of integrating its history into the history of the multi-ethnic and multi-confessional empires dominating its lands for centuries. For this reason, the issue of Religion and Nation in Ukraine has to be considered in a broader context, i.e. Polish-Lithuanian, Russian, Austrian, former-Austrian, and Soviet. This approach involves certain difficulties, but it is the most fruitful in perspective, in order to avoid any distorted form of “regionalism” or “nationalism” so frequent in post-Soviet historiography, as a sort of *revanche* for the long subjugation to the “centre” in political, economic and cultural terms. In this respect, Ukraine shares the general problems common to the former-Soviet realities in search of emancipation²⁷.

It is worth remembering that a perspective of “longue durée” always has to be taken into consideration; the early modern and the modern ages are very important in understanding a series of dynamics in the context of Ukrainian lands up to the 20th century. Nevertheless, we need to implement the studies of the 19th and 20th centuries, examining, in a comparative approach, the relationship between religion and nation in the different Ukrainian regions; to pay attention to the revolutionary period, when the two Russian revolutions coincided with a revolutionary situation in Ukraine that developed into the foundation of the first Ukrainian State (1917-1921); to follow the destiny of the Church, in a broader sense, under the Soviet regime, differentiating the periods, i.e. from Lenin up to Gorbachev, because it is senseless always to speak about a “Soviet peri-

od” in a generic way; to analyse the relationships existing between the various Ukrainian religions in their reciprocal attitudes and in their attitude toward the State; to take into account the role and the influences of emigrated Churches or religious communities on Ukrainian reality, even during the Soviet period; to analyse the question of the underground Church, of the Church of “silence” in its connection with the general movement of “dissent” in Ukraine and the Soviet Union; to examine the archival material in Ukraine and abroad, not neglecting the Vatican archival resources, which are very rich and not yet deeply examined, even though they are consultable only up until 1922.

NOTES

- ¹ This point of view was deeply developed by the specialists of Ukraine convened in Gargnano (18-20 November 2004) for the ESF International Workshop on *The re-integration of Ukraine in Europe: a historical, historiographical and politically urgent issue*. See G. Brogi - G. Lami (eds.), *The re-integration of Ukraine in Europe: a historical, historiographical and politically urgent issue*, Alessandria 2005.
- ² We have had some general works such as: G.A. Hosking (ed.), *Church, Nation and State in Russia and Ukraine*, Edmonton, Alberta 1990; S.K. Batalden, *Seeking God: The Recovery of Religious Identity in Orthodox Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia*, DeKalb, Ill. 1993; W.H. Swatos, *Politics and Religion in Central and Eastern Europe: Traditions and Transitions*, Westport, CT 1994; M. Bourdeaux (ed.), *The Politics of Religion in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, Armonk, N.Y. 1995; P.G. Danchin - E.A. Cole (eds.), *Protecting the Human Rights of Religious Minorities in Eastern Europe*, New York 2002; S. Ferrari - W.C. Durham jr. - E.A. Sewell (eds.), *Diritto e religione nell'Europa post-comunista*, Bologna 2004.
- ³ C.M. Hann, *Religion and Nationality in Central Europe: The Case of the Uniates*, “Ethnic Studies”, 10, 3, 1993, pp. 201-213; H. Johnson, *Religio-Nationalist Subcultures under the Communists: Comparisons from the Baltics, Transcaucasia and Ukraine*, “Sociology of Religion”, 54, 3, 1993, pp. 237-255; G. Gee, *Geography, Nationality and Religion in Ukraine: A Research Note*, “Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion”, 34, 3, 1995, pp. 383-391; S. Plokhly, *Church, State and Nation in Ukraine*, “Religion in Eastern Europe”, 19, 5, 1999, pp. 1-28.
- ⁴ Commonly the word “united” is substituted by “uniate” that has been overlaid with pejorative connotation: in any case I will use here the term “uniate” because it is extensively used in English.
- ⁵ On this first period see: D. Little, *Ukraine. The Legacy of Intolerance*, Washington, D.C. 1991.
- ⁶ G. Lami, *La questione ucraina fra '800 e '900*, Milan 2005.
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- ¹¹ A. Arjakovsky, *Entretiens avec le Cardinal Lubomir Husar. Vers un christianisme post-confessionnel*, s.l. 2005, p. 58.
- ¹² For more details see: S. Ploky, *Between Moscow and Rome: Struggle for the Greek Catholic Patriarchate in Ukraine*, “Journal of Church and State”, 37, 4, 1995, pp. 849-867.
- ¹³ Dilągowa, *Dzieje Unii Brzeskiej* cit.
- ¹⁴ Generally, there was no room in the Russian empire as a whole. On forced conversion of Uniate Ukrainians to Russian Orthodoxy see the innovative study: B. J. Skinner, *The Empress and the Heretics: Catherine II's Challenge to the Uniate Church, 1762-1796 (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus)*, PhD., Georgetown University 2001; see also: G.L. Bruess, *Religion, Identity and Empire: A Greek Archbishop in the Russia of Catherine the Great*, New York 1997. B.J. Skinner analyzed the bloody Ukrainian uprising called Koliivshchyna (1768) in the context of Uniate-Orthodox conflict, demonstrating how “cross-border influences complicated and intensified confessional tensions”: B. Skinner, *Borderlands of Faith: Reconsidering the Origins of a Ukrainian Tragedy*, “Slavic review”, 64, 1, 2005, pp. 88-116. On the concept of religious frontier see: E. Andor - I. G. Toth (eds.), *Frontiers of Faith. Religious Exchange and the Constitution of Religious Identities. 1400-1750*, Budapest 2001; D. Tollet (ed.), *La frontière entre les chrétientés grecque et latine au XVIIème siècle. De la Lithuanie à la Russie subcarpathique*, “XVIIème siècle”, 220, 2003. A very interesting publication in several volumes on the Catholic Church Unions in Central and Eastern Europe is *Polska-Ukraina. 1000 lat sąsiedztwa* (Poland-Ukraine. 1000 years of neighbourhood), Przemysł 1990.
- ¹⁵ A.B. Pekar, *The History of the Church in Carpathian Rus'*, Fairview, NJ 1992.
- ¹⁶ A new study on this crucial topic is: J. Basarab, *Perejaslav 1654. A Historiographical Study*, Edmonton, Alberta 2003.
- ¹⁷ N.L. Chirovsky, *The Church: Defender of Ukrainian National Identity*, “Ukrainian Quarterly”, 46, 1, 1990, pp. 45-58.
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- ¹⁹ J. Pelenski, *The Context of the “Kievan Inheritance” in Russian-Ukrainian Relations: The Origins and Early Ramifications*, in P.J. Potichnyj (ed.), *Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter*, Edmonton, Alberta 1992, pp. 3-19.

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